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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The allegations involved in this litigation are described in the Respondent's Brief filed in
response to Mr. Westover's appeal challenging the district court's ruling granting Idaho Counties
Risk Management Program's ("I CRMP") motion for summary judgment. See Respondent's Brief, §
I.A. To avoid unnecessary repetition, ICRMP adopts, by reference, those portions of its earlier
briefing. The present appeal challenges the district court's decision granting ICRMP its attorneys'
fees incurred defending the plaintiff's complaint.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The litigation leading to the entry of summary judgment in favor ofICRMP is described in
respondent's earlier brief at § LB. and, is incorporated by reference. After the district court issued its
written opinion granting ICRMP's motion for summary judgment, R, p. 232-241, ICRMP filed its
memorandum of costs seeking attorneys' fees. R, p. 244-251. On March 28, 2017, the district court
entered an order granting ICRMP's request for mandatory costs but, denying its request for
attorneys' fees because the materials it had received failed to include a detailed description of the
attorney time expended in the case. LR, p. 19-26. On April 3, 2017, ICRMP filed a motion for
reconsideration with supporting affidavits. LR, p. 28-62. On August 1, 2017, the district court
entered its Order granting ICRMP' s motion. LR, p. 84-92. Oral arguments relating to the attorneys'
fee request were heard October 11, 2017. See Tr, p. 1-23. On August 2, 2017, the district court
entered an order granting ICRMP's motion seeking attorneys' fees. LR, p. 94-105. An amended
judgment was entered on August 2, 2017. LR, p. 108. Plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed August
31, 2017. LR, p. 110.
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C.

Statement of Facts
After the district court granted its motion for summary judgment, ICRMP submitted a

memorandum of costs and motion for attorneys' fees. R, 244. The motion for attorneys' fees was
supported by the affidavit of Anne Magnelli which included an itemization of the attorneys' fees
sought in the motion. LR, 36 (Collaer Aff.,

,r,r 2-3).

Ms. Magnelli is an attorney employed by the

Anderson, Julian & Hull law firm. She worked on the defense of the Westover case. (LR, 40,
Collaer Aff., Ex. 1). A description of the time she personally devoted to the case was included in the
itemization submitted in support ofICRMP's fee request. LR, 46-50.
The motion for attorneys' fees, memorandum of costs and, all supporting materials were sent
to the Franklin County Clerk's office by facsimile. LR, 36, 52-58 (Collaer Aff., ,r 3, Ex. 2-3). All of
the pleadings, with the exception of the Magnelli affidavit, were filed stamped by the clerk's office,
included in the court file, and provided to the district court for its consideration. LR, 36, 61 (Collaer
Aff.,

,r 3, Ex. 2-3).

Because the Magnelli affidavit was not filed by the clerk's office, the district

court initially denied the motion for attorneys' fees as the record lacked an itemization describing the
services provided by the attorneys which the court could review to determine whether the requested
fees were reasonable. See LR, p. 24-25.
Immediately after the district court denied its motion for attorneys' fees, ICRMP filed a
motion for reconsideration providing the court with a copy of the missing Magnelli affidavit and,
facsimile transmissions and receipts establishing the pleadings had been sent to and received by the
Franklin County clerk's office. See LR, p. 28. The district court considered the new evidence and
granted ICRMP's motion for reconsideration. LR, 84. The district court then considered the merits
of the ICRMP motion for attorneys' fees concluding the plaintiffs prosecution of the case was
frivolous. See LR, p. 94.
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II.
ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Correctly Found Westover's Standing Argument Was Frivolous.
In his opening brief, Westover restates his argument that LC. § 12-117(3) should be

interpreted to prohibit insurance companies from selling casualty insurance to governmental entities
such as Franklin County. See Appellant's Brief, p. 12-13. He argues the statute requires attorney fee
awards _be paid only from the local governments operating budget and, for that reason, ICRMP was
prohibited from selling insurance which could provide indemnity coverage for an attorney fee award.

Id. Westover argues he possessed standing to challenge the legality of the sale of the insurance
policy which, he maintains distinguishes this Court's ruling in Brooksby v. GEICO Ins. Co., 153
Idaho 546,286 P.3d 182 (2012). Id., p. 13.
These arguments fail to appreciate the basis of the district court's standing ruling and
highlights why the complaint Mr. Westover pursued against ICRMP was frivolous. The district
court described Westover's claims writing:
[W]estover is attempting to collaterally attack the relationship
between Jase Cundick, the Franklin County Assessor, and Franklin
County with respect to their insurer, ICRMP. Essentially Westover
asserts that it is unlawful for an insurer, in this case ICRMP, to
defend, pay a judgment obtained against its insured, or direct the
litigation on behalf of its insured, in this case Jase Cundick, the
elected assessor and Franklin County. This assertion is premised
upon Westover's reading and interpretation of I. C. § 12-117.
Westover argues that 'I. C. § 12-117 ... requires local government to
bear the brunt of their frivolous conduct out of their operating
budget.' Opposition Memorandum, p. 2.

See LR, p. 98.
The district court concluded that, consistent with this Court's holdings in Brooksby v.
GEICO Ins. Co., supra, Westover lacked standing to challenge the contractual relationship between
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Franklin County and its insurer. The Court further concluded Westover's argument that the
Declaratory Judgment Act created standing was, in light of Brooksby, frivolous. LR, p. 99-100.
In this appeal, Westover continues to argue the Declaratory Judgment Act and, I.C. §
10-1202, created standing to challenge the impact ofI.C. § 12-117 upon the contractual relationship
between ICRMP and Franklin County. Appellant's Brief, p. 12-13. The legal flaw in this approach
was addressed in Brooksby where the plaintiff argued the Declaratory Judgment Act and, LC. § 101202, independently created standing to challenge GEICO's interpretation of the insurance policy
purchased by the plaintiffs father. See 153 Idaho at 548-549. The Court concluded that because
Brooksby had "no rights against, or relationship with, GEICO" the "denial of her claim was not an
injury-in-fact, and she had no standing to contest GEICO's decision." See 153 Idaho at 548.
Rejecting the argument that LC.§ 10-1202 created standing the Court wrote:
In other words, the Act does not create any new rights, statuses or
legal relations. It applies only where such rights, statuses, or legal
relations already exist. At this juncture, Brooksby simply has no
right, status, or legal relationship vis-a-vis GEICO that conform the
basis of a declaratory judgment action.
153 Idaho at 548 (emphasis in original).
The reason the plaintiff in Brooksby lacked standing was the fact she had not experienced an
injury as a result of GEICO's interpretation of the insurance policy purchased by her father. The
personal injuries she suffered in the motor vehicle accident were caused by her father who was the
operator of the vehicle that caused her injuries. The availability of insurance did not add to or
diminish her claims against her father. For that reason, while GEICO's interpretation of its policy
impacted the indemnity coverage of its insured, that decision did not diminish any legal rights the
plaintiff possessed against the insured/responsible driver. See 153 Idaho at 548-549.
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In this case, the district court correctly concluded the holdings in Brooks by are controlling.
Much like the plaintiff in Brooksby, Westover has failed to demonstrate how a decision by ICRMP
to defend its insured in the Westover v. Cundick lawsuit caused him to suffer an injury-in-fact. For
that reason, there was never a "justiciable controversy" between Westover and ICRMP. 1
Accordingly, Westover lacked standing to challenge the contractual relationship between ICRMP
and its insured.
The district court correctly concluded that, at the time the present lawsuit was filed, Brooksby
v. GEICO Ins. Co., supra, was binding authority that had considered and rejected the same standing
argument being advanced by Westover. Westover has failed to provide any argument or authority
distinguishing the holding in Brooksby that requires a litigant to establish standing by showing they
have suffered an injury-in-fact. The alleged injury must be "distinct and palpable and not be one
suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction." See Selkirk-Priest BasinAss'n, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 833-34, 919 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1996). An interest as a concerned citizen in
seeing that the government abides by the law does not confer standing. Young v. City ofKetchum,
137 Idaho 1157, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). The fact Mr. Westover relies upon the interpretation of a
statute which he contends restricted Franklin County's ability to purchase certain coverages in a
casualty policy, as opposed to suggesting the insurance company incorrectly interpreted the insurance
policy it sold its insured, fails to address the standing principles addressed in Brooks by. His stated
desire to utilize the statute to compel Franklin County to accept by his interpretation of the law is

1

Westover' s contention that allowing a local government to purchase casualty insurance encourages frivolous litigation is
unsupported by the facts of this case. The defense ICRMP provided its insured in Westover v. Cundick, 161 Idaho 933,
393 P.3d 593 (2017) was not, as a matter oflaw, frivolous. The ICRMP insureds were granted summary judgment. That
ruling was affirmed by this Court. See 161 Idaho at 598. Westover's suggestion that LC.§ 12-117 was intended to
provide "a disincentive to such suits",~ Appellant's Brief, p. 12 is, in realty, an attempt to deny the insured the benefit
of a legal defense paid by the insurance company. The fact Franklin County possessed the resources to mount a
successful defense does not create a 'Justiciable controversy" between Westover and Franklin County's insurer.
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inconsistent with this Court's opinions explaining the standing requirement and, the requirement that
litigants allege and demonstrate an injury-in-fact. See Troutnerv. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389,391,
28 P .3d 926, 928 (2006).
Westover' s suggestion that LC. § 10-1202 independently creates standing was clearly rejected
by this Court. See Brooksby, 153 Idaho at 548. Rather than provide any authority to support an
argument he suffered an injury-in-fact that created a justiciable controversy between himself and
ICRMP, Westover chose to ignore this Court's prior precedent and pursue a legal theory that was
previously rejected in Brooksby v. GEICO Ins. Co., supra. This caused the district court to
conclude he had pursued his claim against ICRMP frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation. LR, p. 98-100. The district court's decision should be affirmed.

B.

The District Court Correctly Reconsidered Its Initial Order Denying ICRMP's Motion
for Attorneys' Fees.
After the district court granted its motion for summary judgment, ICRMP filed a timely

memorandum of costs. R, p. 252-254. ICRMP also filed a motion for attorneys' fees, R, p. 244 and
a supporting brief. R, p. 246-251. Westover then filed a memorandum opposing ICRMP's
attorneys' fee request. R, p. 256-261.
On March 28, 2017, the district court denied ICRMP's request for attorneys' fees on the
grounds the defendant had not provided a sufficient itemization which prevented the court from
determining the reasonableness of the fees that were being sought. LR, p. 24. Upon reviewing the
court docket, ICRMP discovered the affidavit of attorney Anne S. Magnelli, which included a
detailed accounting of the attorneys' fees incurred by ICRMP defending the case, was not included in
the court record. See LR, p. 36, 46-50. A motion for reconsideration was prepared supported by the
affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer. LR, p. 28-29, 35-62. The Collaer affidavit advised the court the
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Magnelli affidavit had been faxed to and received by the clerk's office along with the memorandum
of costs, the motion for attorneys' fees and costs, and the memorandum in support. LR, p. 36
(Collaer Aff.,

1 3).

The facsimile verification confirmed these pleadings, which included the

Magnelli affidavit, were received by the clerk's office and plaintiffs counsel.2 LR, p. 36, 52-58
(Collaer Aff.,

1 4, Ex.

2-3). The district court was also provided a copy of the electronic docket

which showed that, with the exception of the Magnelli affidavit, all ofICRMP's pleadings relating to
the memorandum of costs and request for attorneys' fees had been filed by the clerk. LR, 36 (Collaer
Aff.,

,r 4, Ex. 3, pgs. 2-3).

Based upon this record, ICRMP asked the court to reconsider its order

denying attorneys' fees as, due to an error in the clerk's office, the materials that were submitted to
comply with the requirements of LR. C.P. 54 had not been filed or provided to the district court for its
consideration.
On April 3, 2017, the district court granted the motion for reconsideration. R, p. 84-92. The
court agreed the record established a "mistake oversight or omission had occurred in the Franklin
County clerk's office". LR, p. 90. The court concluded that, consistent with the discretion it was
afforded by LR. C.P. 60(a), its earlier ruling denying the I CRMP motion for attorneys' fees should be
reconsidered. LR, p. 92.
In this appeal, Westover argues the district court erred suggesting its decision to reconsider an
earlier ruling that had been influenced by a clerical error "would require trial courts and opposing
parties, upon finding the memorandum of costs does not itemize the attorneys' fees as required by
the rule to rummage around the court files and documents served to see if there is an affidavit that
might meet the requirements of the rule." Appellant's Brief, p. 11. This argument misstates the

2

At oral argument, counsel acknowledged receiving the memorandum of costs and the Magnelli affidavit. See TR 12: 1824 (4/27/17 hearing).
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record and, is factually and legally frivolous. The district court did not independently locate the
Magnelli affidavit. The Court was provided the missing affidavit through ICRMP's motion for
reconsideration. LR, p. 36 (Collaer Aff.,

,r

3). The evidence supporting the ICRMP motion

established the Magnelli affidavit was received by the clerk's office as well as the office of
Westover's current attorney. LR, p. 56-58. This evidence, which is not contested by Westover,
caused the district court to exercise its discretion and, reconsider its prior ruling. LR, 87-88.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration under LR. C.P. 60 is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Foster v. Kootenai Medical Center, 143 Idaho 425, 146 P.3d 691 (2006).
This involves a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc.
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).

See 143 Idaho at 428.
Lacking in Westover' s argument is any authority or factual support suggesting the district
court abused its discretion. The court recognized it possessed the discretion to cure the clerical
mistake it found had occurred in the clerk's office. Considering the evidence establishing a clerical
error occurred is undisputed, one cannot logically argue the district court failed to comply with
applicable legal standards or, that it failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See Silsby

v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410,411, 95 P.3d 28, 29 (2004) (finding a clerical error subject to Rule 60(a)
"applies to those errors in which the ' ... type of mistake or omission [is] mechanical in nature which
is apparent in the record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney."')
Rather than describe how the court abused its discretion, Westover appears to suggest the court
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should have ignored the fact the Magnelli affidavit was somehow misplaced in the clerk's office and
allow that error to prevent the court from considering the merits of the ICRMP attorneys' fee
motion. 3 This argument is not supported by any authority and, is inconsistent with the remedial
intent of Rule 60. See Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594, 597, 733 P.2d 815, 818 (1987)
(finding Rule 60(a) deals with the correction of errors arising from oversight or omission.) Based
upon this record, it is very clear the district court correctly reconsidered its prior ruling and, then
considered the merits of the ICRMP fee motion. The district court's decision to grant ICRMP's
motion for reconsideration should be affirmed.
In his brief, Mr. Westover suggests Ms. Magnelli' s affidavit should not have been considered
arguing she had not appeared in the case and lacked personal knowledge of the attorney services
provided to ICRMP. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. The suggestion that Ms. Magnelli lacked personal
knowledge of the case is nothing more than unsupported argument of counsel and, is contrary to her
unrebutted testimony where she states she possessed personal knowledge of the matters described in
her affidavit. See LR, p. 40-41 (Magnelli Aff., ,r 3). The fact she did not file a personal appearance
does not suggest she was not involved in the defense. This is demonstrated by the itemization
attached to her affidavit which describes the work she personally performed and reveals she was very
familiar with the case. LR, p. 46-50. In fact, Ms. Magnelli was involved with the preparation of the
motion for summary judgment, preparing answers to discovery, responding to the motion to compel,
and preparing the motion for protective order. See LR, p. 46-49. The time entries dated July 19 and
September 19, 2016, document telephone conversations between Ms. Magnelli and plaintiff's
counsel establishing counsel was aware that Ms. Magnelli was working on the case. LR, 48-49. The

3

The district court found the Magnelli affidavit was received in the clerk's office but, for unknown reasons, was not
"file stamped, entered into ISTARS and/or the court file." LR, 90-91.
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suggestion that Ms. Magnelli lacked personal knowledge concerning the legal work that was
expended to defend this case is unsupported by the record and, is factually frivolous. The district
court's reliance on the Magnelli affidavit and the itemization attached to her affidavit does not
demonstrate an abuse of discretion and, should be affirmed.

III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the ruling of the district court awarding ICRMP its attorneys'
fees expended defending this case should be affirmed .

-

. L;2_ day of January, 2018.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTEDth1s
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By

~ -:-J .

C4 Q0.

Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for ICRMP
Defendants/Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /Sday of January, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
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Blake S. Atkin
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P. C.
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
T: (801) 533-0300
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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- 11

I!]

D
D
D
D

~

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0300
Email: atkin@atkinlawoffices.net
E-File/E-Serve

